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Abstract
We analyze the current state of the monetary integration in Eu-
rope focusing on the UK position regarding the European Monetary
Union. The interest rates decisions of the European Central Bank
and the Bank of England are compared through diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the Taylor Rule. The comparison of the monetary conducts
provides a useful feedback when looking for the diﬀerences claimed
by the British government as motivating the UK refusal to join the
European Monetary Union. Testing for a forward looking behavior
and possible asymmetries in the policy responses, we show evidence
supporting the opt-out by the UK monetary authorities.
11 Introduction
The British opt-out is key in shaping the monetary policy interaction be-
tween United Kingdom and the European Union. It is well known that the
Bank of England (BoE) and the European Central Bank (ECB) are his-
torically committed to somehow diﬀerent priorities: the Monetary Policy
Committee of the BoE supports the objectives of growth and employment
while maintaining price stability, on the contrary, for the ECB, price stability
is the priority. Moreover, it is often argued by British monetary authorities
that the European Central Bank conservative approach to monetary policy
and its overriding commitment to price stability, might be destabilizing for
British economy both in stationary conditions and under economic cyclical
ﬂuctuations.
We compare the ECB and BoE monetary policies to check for the lack
of monetary convergence claimed by the British government as motivating
the refusal to join the monetary union. In doing that, we use a Taylor Rule
approach.
Introduced by Taylor (1993), the “Rule” is proposed as a monetary policy
conduct: interest rates are systematically set in response to the upward or
downward deviations of the inﬂation rate and the output from its target and
its potential level respectively. Starting from this, a vast empirical literature
followed (for a comprehensive review see Sauer and Sturm, 2003) and several
theoretical modiﬁcations were proposed. In particular Clarida et al. (1998)
introduce expectations in the model, while Sack and Wieland (2000) discuss
the role of interest rate smoothing.
The empirical literature on this ﬁeld covers both the Bank of England
2and the ECB monetary policy actions. A comprehensive study about the
Bank of England monetary choices has been presented by Nelson (2000)
who estimates the Taylor Rule for diﬀerent subsamples based on relevant
monetary changes between 1972 and 1997. The author ﬁnds that the response
to the inﬂation and to the output gap varies within the chosen subsamples,
showing that the policy priorities changed over time. In particular he argues
that the commitment to price stability was not signiﬁcant between 1987 and
1990 and it became relevant after 1992. McCallum (2000) compares the
classical Taylor rule with an alternative policy where the monetary base is
targeted by the BoE. His estimation shows that while both rules are able to
catch the inﬂationary pressures of the 1970s, the monetary base instrument
rule implies that policy was too loose during the middle and late 80s whereas
the Taylor rules does not.
As soon as the ECB oﬃcially entered into operation in 1998, many studies
proposed an ex-ante approach to the future policy conduct in the Euro area
and compared it to monetary policy rules. By simulating an open economy
model, Taylor (1999) argues that a simple benchmark rule as the Taylor
Rule is a good candidate in terms of eﬃciency and robustness as a guideline
for ECB monetary policy. In a similar setup, Peersman and Smets (1999)
compare several monetary rules simulating a closed economy model based
on ﬁve European Countries1. The authors show that the original Taylor
Rule does a good job in stabilizing inﬂation and output without any need
for other instrument variables in the model. In an empirical contribution,
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) test the Taylor Rule using a proxy of the EU
1The selected countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
3monetary conduct by weighting economic data of eleven countries between
1990 and 1997. They ﬁnd that the original Taylor Rule performs well with
estimates of the coeﬃcients close to those of Taylor (1993). They also test
a forward looking speciﬁcation augmented with several economic variables
as controls, showing similar results. As a ﬁrst test of the Taylor rule based
on EU data Sauer and Sturm (2003) compare the monetary conducts of
the ECB and the Bundesbank. Testing both a classical Taylor rule and a
forward looking one, they argue that The European Central Bank inherited
the conservative approach from the Bundesbank.
Building on this literature, we test the Taylor Rule for both the ECB
and the BoE in its basic form and the relevant extensions. The robustness of
results is checked introducing both forward looking expectations (see Clarida
et al., 1998) and the interest rate smoothing (see Sack and Wieland, 2000)
in our estimation. Following Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), further instru-
ment variables to control for the role of the exchange rate and the monetary
markets are introduced.
Finally, we complete our analysis testing for Central Banks’ behavior un-
der diﬀerent phases of the business cycle. In its basic formulation, the Taylor
Rule implies a symmetric behavior by the Central Banks while setting the in-
terest rates. This implicit hypothesis was recently challenged in the literature
both empirically and theoretically. On the empirical side, there are recent
contributions showing evidence of non linearities for three European coun-
tries (Germany, France and Spain) and the US monetary policies (see Dolado
et al., 2004, 2005). On the theoretical side, non linearities in the policy re-
sponses are explained with: i) non linearities in the underlying aggregate
4supply schedule (see Nobay and Peel, 2000), ii) non linear preferences for the
policy makers (e.g. Surico, 2007), iii) uncertainty in economic fundamentals
(see Meyer et al., 2001).
To test for a possible non linear behavior by the policy makers, we take
regime-switching into the model assuming that the output switches among
diﬀerent and unobservable states of the economy. Central bankers infer
regime probabilities from output realizations, so that they develop their state
beliefs and use them to formulate asymmetric monetary policy decisions2.
This exercise improves our work since it accounts for possible shifts in the
monetary policies due to economic downturn that aﬀected both the economic
systems over the sample period we analyze. Furthermore it allows us to check
if the ECB and BoE’s attitudes to achieve output stabilization is not aligned
when changing economic conditions are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces
the theoretical framework behind the monetary rules. In section 3 we describe
the data and explain the details of our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents
the results and section 5 concludes. concludes.
2 Methodology
The baseline monetary policy reaction function used in our empirical exercise
is a classical Taylor rule speciﬁed as:
2With a quite diﬀerent approach, Altavilla and Landolfo (2005) compared ECB and
BoE’s monetary policies through a Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive (MS-VAR)
model to detect possible asymmetries in front of economic ﬂuctuations.
5it = i
∗ + β(πt − π
∗) + γ(yt − y
∗), (1)
where i∗ is the steady state value of the nominal interest rate, πt is the current
inﬂation rate, π∗ is the inﬂation target set by the central bank, yt is the real
output of the economy and y∗ is its potential level.
We estimate its empirical counterpart as
it = α + βπt + γgt + υt (2)
where α = i∗ −βπ∗ deﬁnes the real interest rate, gt = (yt −y∗) is the output
gap, and υt is an i.i.d normal error term.
As a second step in our empirical analysis we investigate whether central
bankers respond to anticipated inﬂation rather then realized inﬂation. To do
this, we can follow Clarida et al. (1998) in specifying the monetary policy
reaction function as
  it = i
∗ + β(Et [πt+n] − π
∗) + γ(yt − y
∗) (3)
where the actual rate partially adjust to the speciﬁed target (  it) to account
for a smoothing behavior by central bankers (see Goodfriend (1991) and Sack
and Wieland (2000), among others):
it = (1 − ρ)  it + ρit−1 + ̟t (4)
with it−1 being the lagged interest rate, ρ being the coeﬃcient capturing the
degree of smoothing of the interest rate, and ̟t being a standard i.i.d. error
6term. By combining equation (3) and (4), we obtain the estimable equation
it = α
∗ + β
∗ Et [πt+n] + γ
∗gt + ρit−1 + ̟t, (5)
where α∗ = α(1 − ρ), β∗ = β(1 − ρ), and γ∗ = γ(1 − ρ).
2.1 Regime switching model
To investigate whether central bankers respond asymmetrically to business
cycle, we model the above introduced monetary reaction functions (eqs. (2)
and (5)) in a regime switching economy. We model an economy where the
output switches between (unobservable) states, and an agent (i.e. a central
banker) infers the probabilities of being in a particular state from the output
realizations. The inferred probabilities are then used in the monetary policy
decisions3.
Speciﬁcally, We consider the economy in a regime switching model, where
its latent state is indicated by st. We assume that st follows a hidden Markov
chain with transition probabilities matrix P (see Hamilton (1989)).
The two reaction functions (2) and (5) are then speciﬁed as regime de-
pendent policy rules:
it = α(st) + β(st)πt + γ(st)gt + υt (6)
it = α
∗(st) + β
∗(st)Et [πt+n] + γ
∗(st)gt + ρ
∗(st)it−1 + ̟t (7)
3Instead, in their MS-VAR setting, Altavilla and Landolfo (2005) specify the reaction
functions as regime dependent
7The evolution of the state of the economy in terms of state beliefs (ξt+1)
can be expressed as realizations of the equation:
ξt+1 = Pξt + ǫt. (8)
The agents cannot directly observe the state of the economy, st, and they
have to rely on interpreting external signals. In our speciﬁcation we use as a
signal of the state of the economy the output growth rates (∆logyt), which
is supposed to follow a state dependent process in its mean ( ), with i.i.d
normal innovations with volatility (σ). Thus, the agents update their belief
according to the posterior probabilities computed as
ˆ ξt+1|t = P
ˆ ξt|t−1 ⊙ ζt
1′
 
ˆ ξt|t−1 ⊙ ζt
 , (9)
where ⊙ denotes the Hadamard product, ζt is a vector that stacks the con-





f (∆logyt | st = 1,Ωt−1)
. . .





with the density of ∆logyt conditional on state st is deﬁned as:












where Ω denotes the information set.
83 Data and Estimation
For our empirical tests, we use quarterly data focusing, given their availabil-
ity, on the time period between 1987 to 2010. Data are mainly taken from the
Area Wide Model (AWM) Database, constructed by Fagan et al. (2005), and
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database. Data from Eurostat,
after being re-based to the same base year as for the AWM data (1996), are
used to complete the AWM series, which end in the fourth quarter of 2009.
As a measure for short term nominal interest rate of the Euro area we use
the 3-month Euro Inter Bank Oﬀered Rate (EURIBOR) while, for the United
Kingdom we use the 3-month London Inter Bank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR)4.
Quarterly inﬂation rates are computed as the percentage change in the
price indexes over the previous four quarters. For the Euro Area we use the
Core Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices which is less volatile than the
overall HICP as it excludes energy and unprocessed food prices. According
to their availability, HICP data begin only in 1988q3.
To estimate United Kingdom’s inﬂation rate we use a joint measure, in-
stead. Until 2003 British inﬂation was oﬃcially measured by the Retail Price
Index (RPIX). Since December 2003 the Harmonized Consumer Price Index
(HICP) is used. Accordingly, from 1987 to 2003 we measure inﬂation using
the Retail Price Index (RPIX); after that, from 2004 to 2010 the Core HICP
(excluding energy and unprocessed food) is employed5.
4Previous contributions (see e.g. Sauer and Sturm, 2003), are uncertain whether the
EURIBOR or the EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) should be preferred as the
reference interest rate for the Euro-Area. As a robustness check, we employ also the latter
in our estimates ﬁnding very similar results.
5HICPs Data are provided by Eurostat, The RPIX index is extracted from The Oﬃce
for National Statistics Database.
9As is standard practice in literature, the output gaps are identiﬁed by
analyzing data decomposed by a frequency ﬁlter. Our measure of cyclical
output is obtained applying the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter to the
real Industrial Production series. The output gap is then measured as the
percentage deviation of the index from its potential level6.
To estimate the regime switching model we employ for both countries the
quarterly real GDP growth rate. The UK economy is estimated over the
time period 1987 to 2010, while the European Union economy is estimated
employing the series provided by The Area Wide Model Database.
Finally, as explained below, to estimate equation (5) and its regime-
switching counterpart we use generalized methods of moments (GMM). Fol-
lowing Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), besides the current inﬂation rate, we
use a set of instrumental variables to control for the role of the monetary and
the exchange rate markets:
• Money Growth rate is calculated as the percentage annual variation of
the overall index of the monetary aggregate M3 provided by the OECD
Statistics Portal.
• Federal Funds Rates are quarterly averages of monthly ﬁgures that are
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
• Dollar/Sterling real exchange rate is measured as the Nominal Dollar
per Sterling Rate multiplied by a price deﬂator. The price deﬂator is
constructed as the ratio of UK Consumer Price Index and the United
6As suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) we use a λ = 1600 for our quarterly
database
10States Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The nominal exchange rate is provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
• Euro/Sterling real exchange rate is calculated as a crossed rate be-
tween the Dollar/Sterling real exchange rate and the Dollar/Euro real
exchange rate provided by The Area Wide Model Database provided
by Fagan et al. (2005).
3.1 Estimation procedure
Turning to the empirics, we carefully took care of possible econometric biases
that can arise when estimating the two response functions. In the baseline
linear model we account for possible serial correlation in the residuals by
estimating equation (2) with a Prais and Winsten (1954) procedure, having
its standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity.
The same baseline reaction function under the regime switching hypothe-
sis requires a three steps procedure. First, we estimate the regime switching
model using a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) procedure on the output
series. In this, we closely followed the algorithm described in Section 9.1 of
Kim and Nelson (1999), obtaining the estimated state beliefs (ˆ ξt|t−1).
Second, to account for possible serial correlation, we “pre-whiten” the
data and the regressors using the estimated serial correlation of residuals








where e are the residuals obtained by regressing the nominal interest rate
on a constant, the inﬂation rate, and the output gap. Then, we adjust both
the regressors and the dependent variable according to:
˜ Yt+1 = Yt+1 + ˆ ρYt
˜ Xt+1 = Xt+1 + ˆ ρXt,
where Y is the vector that stores the time series of the nominal interest
rate and X is the matrix containing the inﬂation rate and the output gap.
Third, we estimate the policy function (6) by maximum-likelihood, using
the state beliefs obtained from the MCMC estimation as weights for the
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where (i = 1,2) indicates the state of the economy, and ˆ B is the vector
of coeﬃcients to be estimated.
7See L¨ utkepohl (2006), chapter 17.
12In the forward looking extension of the model we employ a GMM pro-
cedure, with the expected inﬂation instrumented by a constant, the current
inﬂation rate, and any other variable entering the model (see Clarida et al.,




∗gt + θzt + ρit−1 + ̟t, (12)
where zt indicates an additional instrumental variable taken from the list
provided in section 3.
Turning to the regime switching speciﬁcation, a similar methodology to
the three steps procedure described for the baseline model is adopted to
estimate equation (7). After having estimated the state beliefs (ˆ ξt|t−1) with
the MCMC algorithm, we instrumented the expected inﬂation rate using
the same instruments as in the linear case. Finally, we estimate the policy
function (7) again by maximum-likelihood using the state beliefs obtained
from the MCMC algorithm as weights for the monetary responses for each
state of the economy.
4 Results
The MCMC procedure outlined in subsection 2.1 gives comforting results
when applied to the UK economy. The estimated probabilities of switching
from the two states are 4.18% and 17.9%, respectively. This implies an
average duration of almost 6 years for the high GDP growth rate state, and
slightly more than one year for the low GDP growth rate state.
[Figure 1 about here.]
13Figure 1 conﬁrms that the model is able to pick up the historical business
cycles of the UK economy. It plots the estimated posterior probability of
being in the low mean state, showing how the Markov switching model is
able to capture fairly well the UK recessions as chronicled by the oﬃcial
Bank of England business cycle dates8 (the gray areas in the graph).
Turning to the EU economy, the MCMC estimates provide a probability
of switching of 2.20% for the high mean state and of 19.78% for the low mean
state. This implies an average duration of more than 11 years for the high
GDP growth rate state, and slightly more than one year for the low GDP
growth rate state.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The capability of picking up the EU business cycle seems less satisfactory.
Figure 2 shows how the Markov switching model is able to capture two out of
four of the recessions as chronicled by the CEPR business cycle dates9 (the
gray areas in the graph). This can be due to several reasons. Among these,
may be of interest to recall that the CEPR dating committee claims that
the EU “experienced a prolonged pause in the growth of economic activity”
during the period 2001-2003 without ending up in a recession for the ﬁrst two
quarters of 2003. This period can mislead the MCMC algorithm in detecting
the diﬀerent states of the series.
As a ﬁrst test of the two monetary policies, we estimate a standard Taylor
Rule as the one reported in equation (2). Generally speaking, both the EU
8see Ryland et al. (2010).
9http://www.cepr.org/data/dating/
14and the UK results, reported in table 1, show evidence of ﬁrst order auto-
correlation of the errors, supporting our choice of the estimation procedure.
Turning to the coeﬃcients, when the whole sample is used, the estimates
for the European Union are in support of a stabilizing policy towards the
nominal indicator, while the business cycle indicator is indeed signiﬁcant but
statistically lower than the value 0.5 predicted by the Taylor principle and,
more importantly lower than the coeﬃcient on inﬂation by a factor of 1010.
Interestingly, if we focus on the subsample starting when the ECB oﬃcially
took control over the monetary policy (January 1999), these estimates show
evidence of an accommodative policy with an inﬂation coeﬃcient still higher
than the output coeﬃcient but less than one. So, even if the ECB seems
to weight more the nominal indicator, it seems not to adhere to the Taylor
principle.
On the contrary the Bank of England seems to follow an accommodative
policy. In fact, when the rule is assessed on the whole sample, the coeﬃcient
on the inﬂation is estimated to be signiﬁcant but well below unity (0.599).
Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of the output gap, even is signiﬁcant, is estimated
to be only 0.229. Thus, when the classical Taylor Rule is the benchmark,
the BoE seems to weight more the inﬂation indicator11. We also provide
estimates on the UK monetary policy during the same subsample of the EU
ones. When the decade 1999-2010 is considered (see second column of table
1, UK panel) the estimates fail to conﬁrm the classical Taylor Rule as we
ﬁnd a coeﬃcient for the inﬂation not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This
10To control for the exchange market pressures in the beginning of the nineties, we use
the “dummy1992” indicator variable for the period 1992q3 to 1993q3.
11We added the “dummy1992” also in the UK regression. The indicator variable turns
out to be signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcients estimates are virtually non sensible to its inclusion.
15latter result is probably attributable to the strong liquidity injection due to
the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) started in March 2009 by the BoE to face
the recent ﬁnancial turmoil.
[Table 1 about here.]
Pushing our analysis further, in table 2 we provide estimates for the for-
ward looking speciﬁcation. In the ﬁrst panel the EU estimates are provided.
The ﬁrst column reports the estimates for equation (5), while the rest of the
columns show the results when a series of control variables are added, namely
a liquidity indicator measured with the M3 rate of growth, the interest rates
of both UK and US, the real exchange rates with US and UK, and the lagged
inﬂation. The estimates show support in favor of a foreign interest rate as
a control in the forward looking speciﬁcation. In fact, when either the US
or the UK nominal short term rates are employed both the output gap and
the inﬂation coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. On the contrary the monetary ag-
gregate does not seem to have a role in the ECB conduct. This is somehow
surprising given the strategy that the ECB claims to follow. In fact the
ECB commitment to price stability is enforced by the wide agreement that
the development of the price level is a monetary matter. According to this,
monetary aggregates hold a favorable role in the monetary policy analysis
because of their predictive power for the future path of the inﬂation rate in
the medium and in the long term. That’s why, since 1999 the ECB reserved
a prominent role for the broader monetary aggregate (M3) within its “two
pillar strategy”.
In their 2011 bulletin (see The Monetary Policy of the ECB May 2011)
they states that the “monetary analysis” pillar raises from the link between
16M3 and inﬂation in the Euro Area, which is robust in the long run: the shifts
in the trend of the money growth tend to inﬂuence the trend of the inﬂation
rate, giving a nominal anchor to the expected inﬂation. Moreover, excessive
money or credit growth are often conjoined with asset prices over-valuation
phenomena: hence, monetary aggregates might serve as useful indicators
for the detection of the imbalances in asset market dynamics. So the ECB
Governing Council set a medium term reference value for the Monetary Ag-
gregate and oﬃcially announced it in January 1999 clarifying that they would
monitor the deviations of the money aggregate against its reference value on
the basis of a three-month moving average.
However deviations of the money growth from its reference value may
be due to both persistent and temporary factors. In the short run money
growth might be aﬀected by temporary changes in the money demand and
in the money velocity. These factors don’t threat the price stability in the
medium term but do interfere with the link between money and prices in the
short run.
Because of this informational limit, the ECB claims that they don’t not
mechanically react to all the deviations of M3, relying instead on a broader
information set given by both monetary and non-monetary variables. In
particular the ECB clearly states that the “economic analysis” pillar, which
includes non monetary indicators of the real activity and cost factors, has
lately, starting from the end of 2003, gained a greater relevance.
To further analyze this issue, we re-estimate equation (5) for the Euro
area, using the percentage deviation of the monetary aggregate from its po-
tential level calculated with the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter instead of
17its growth rate. When the whole sample is employed, we obtain the following
estimates
it = −0.26 + 0.32
∗ Et [πt+n] + 0.08
∗∗∗ Et [gt] + 0.90
∗∗∗it−1 − 0.10
∗∗∆M3t,
where ∗ ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate a signiﬁcance level of 5%, 1% and 0.1%
respectively. This conﬁrms that a measure of the deviation of M3 is a better
indicator of the “monetary analysis” pillar of the ECB. Moreover, when the
same forward looking Taylor rule is estimated censoring the sample to the
last quarter of 2003, we get a coeﬃcient on ∆M3t of −0.16, statisytically
diﬀerent from zero, indicating a closer attention to the second pillar of the
“monetary analysis” in the beginning of the sample.
Focusing on the speciﬁcation with the US short nominal rate as a control,
to check for the relative strength of the policy responses we need to ﬁrst
recover the implied elasticities (β and γ) from the regression coeﬃcients β∗
and γ∗. The results conﬁrm the strong preference for the price stability by
the EU giving a value of the implied elasticities on inﬂation and output gap
of 2.75 and 0.78 respectively12.
[Table 2 about here.]
The second panel reports the same set of regression on the UK economy.
The estimates seems to be fairly stable across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
12When the UK nominal rate is used as a control, the implied elasticities are even
diverging stronger with a value of 3.15 and 0.47 for the inﬂation and for the output gap
respectively
18In this case, the price stabilizing behavior of the Bank of England is con-
ﬁrmed with an implied elasticity on inﬂation ranging from 1.65 to 2.5, when
both the output gap and the inﬂation coeﬃcient are signiﬁcant. Remarkably
the implied elasticity on the output gap is always close to 0.5 implying an
adherence of the BoE to the Taylor principle.
Clearly the linearity of the speciﬁcations tested above, do not help us in
capturing if the Central Banks adjust their responses based on the business
cycle they believe the economy is in. This can be particularly important if
we want to assess the diﬀerent responses to the real side of the economy.
To overcome this problem we employ the estimation based on the regime
switching model depicted is subsection 3.1.
Table 3 reports the estimates for equation (6). That is a simple Taylor
Rule allowed to switch following the state of the economy. It is worth noting
that the BoE has a stabilizing policy regardless of the business cycle. Consis-
tently with the hypothesis that the real side of economy is more considered
during a low growth period, the coeﬃcient of the output become signiﬁcant
and positive only during recessions (see column 1). Interestingly the ECB
shows a diﬀerent behavior when regimes are accounted for. In particular the
inﬂation coeﬃcient is now well above unity during both states of the econ-
omy and rises to 3.7 during busts. Moreover, in this case the coeﬃcient of
the output become signiﬁcant and positive only during booms.
[Table 3 about here.]
Finally the regime based forward looking model introduced in equation
(7) is tested. Results reported in table 4 conﬁrm the intuition of its linear
19counterpart. On the whole sample (see column 1), The BoE has a stabilizing
inﬂation targeting during booms (the implied elasticity β is ranging from
2.04 to 2.47), maintaining basically the same policy during recessions. On
the opposite, output becomes more relevant during recessions. In fact, while
in boom periods the value of its implied elasticity is well below one, during
recessions the implied elasticity jumps up above one with values between
1.02 to 1.32. This conﬁrms that, when the state of economy is considered,
the Bank of England does pay a higher attention to the real side of economy
when is needed (i.e. during recessions).
Turning to the EU estimates, the results are less satisfactory in terms of
diﬀerent response of the Central Bank based on the state of the economy.
The last two columns of table 4 show that the ECB focuses on a stabilizing
inﬂation targeting regardless of the state of the economy (the implied elas-
ticities associated with the inﬂation are 2.86 and 1.92 during booms and 3.39
and 2.49 during recessions respectively). On the contrary, the responses to
output are well below one during booms, turning to not statistically signiﬁ-
cant when the fed funds are used as control variable.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd compelling evidence that the EU follows a stabi-
lizing policy with respect to the price stability target. This is robust to
diﬀerent extensions of the classical Taylor Rule and is conﬁrmed when eco-
nomic regimes are accounted for. Interestingly when the real indicator is
considered, the estimates shows a low elasticity of the response to the output
gap.
Turning to the BoE estimates, we found evidence of a stabilizing policy
towards the price stability target as well, especially when the autoregressive
20behavior on the interest rate (i.e. in the forward looking speciﬁcation) is
considered. Moreover, our results support the closer attention paid by the
UK monetary authority to the real indicator. The stronger response to the
output gap, with respect to the ECB conduct, becomes clearer when we
adjust our estimate for the business cycles.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Conclusion
We focused on a comparison between the Bank of England and The Euro-
pean Central Bank monetary conducts. The comparative estimates of the
Taylor Rule proposed in this paper adds to the previous literature as they
contextualize the monetary choices of the two authorities within the process
of integration in Europe, which is not yet complete. In 1992, by exercis-
ing the opt-out clause from the EU law concerning the monetary union, the
United Kingdom has deferred the choice to adhere to the European Monetary
Union. British monetary authorities raised and still conﬁrm deep concerns
about the exhaustiveness of the Maastricht criteria and the economic beneﬁts
the United Kingdom could enjoy by entering the Eurozone.
Our empirical results seems to support the British claims: when we take
into account interest rate smoothing the BoE estimates comply with the
Taylor principle showing a stabilizing behavior with respect to prices and
a stronger response to the gdp cycle. This latter behavior seems not to be
followed by the ECB monetary conduct, whose estimates of the elasticity
to the real indicator show values consistently less than the ones obtained
21for the BOE. Interestingly, these results are robust to a regime switching
speciﬁcation, where the monetary authorities set their policy responses based
on the inferred beliefs of being in a particular state of the economy.
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24Figure 1: Posterior probabilities of a low growth rate in UK
This ﬁgure shows the estimated posterior probabilities of being in a recession coupled
with the oﬃcial BoE recession dates (shadow area). Data employed in the estimation are
quarterly starting from 1987.
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25Figure 2: Posterior probabilities of a low growth rate in EU
This ﬁgure shows the estimated posterior probabilities of being in a recession coupled
with the oﬃcial CRSP recession dates (shadow area). Data employed in the estimation
are quarterly starting from 1970.
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26Table 1: Simple Taylor rule
This table reports the estimates of the baseline Taylor rule introduced in equation (2).
The dependent variable are the short term nominal interest rates.
European Union
1989q1-2010q3 1999q1-2010q3
Inﬂ. (β) 1.22*** .631*










Inﬂ. (β) .599*** .0148








* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
27Table 2: Forward looking
This table reports the estimates of the forward looking model in equation (5)
European Union
E. inﬂ (β∗) .102 .388 .396* .767*** .149 .154 .174
Int. rate (-1) (ρ) .947*** .877*** .762*** .721*** .943*** .938*** .921***
Out. gap (γ∗) .096*** .112*** .0589*** .0492* .0839*** .0887*** .0952***
dummy1992 .0262 .2 .546 .524 .0319 .046 .109
M3 growth -.0739
Int. rate UK .113***
Int. rate US .098**
Exch. rate UK EU .587
Exch. rate EU US -.695
Lagged Inﬂ. -.00278
Cons -.0458 .217 -.466** -.728*** -.96 .387 -.0745
Adj. R2 0.985 0.988 0.988 0.982 0.986 0.985 0.987
Obs. 83 83 83 83 83 83 82
χ2 4689.465 5601.964 5663.510 4099.278 5016.842 4810.791 5218.853
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom
E. inﬂ (β∗) .335* .377* .338* .334* .425* .366* .489*
Int. rate (-1) (ρ) .83*** .848*** .797*** .825*** .792*** .813*** .835***
Out. gap (γ∗) .131* .191*** .132* .125** .0875 .0998 .0846
dummy1992 .126 -.249 -.0263 .135 .357 .185 .121
M3 growth -.0776**
Int. rate EU .0396
Int. rate US .0123
Exch. rate UK EU 1.54**
Exch. rate UK US 1.16*
Lagged Inﬂ. -.103
Cons .0106 .572* .0234 -.00393 -2.19* -1.91* -.17
Adj. R2 0.962 0.967 0.962 0.962 0.954 0.961 0.942
Obs. 93 89 93 93 93 93 93
χ2 2712.641 3147.983 2836.550 2798.859 1821.105 3084.973 1276.039
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
28Table 3: Simple Taylor rule with regimes
This table reports the estimates for equation (6) in the regime switching model
UK EU
Boom
Cons. (α) 1.236*** -0.507***
Inﬂ. (β) 1.457*** 2.704***
Out. gap (γ) 0.147 0.201**
Recession
Cons. (α) 0.876** -2.182***
Inﬂ. (β) 1.413*** 3.700***
Out. gap (γ) 0.232* -0.0447
ρ 0.813 0.879
Adj. R2 0.76 0.81
Obs. 95 87
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
29Table 4: Regimes
This table reports the estimates for equation (7) in the regime switching model
UK EU
Boom
Cons. (α∗) 0.049 0.548*** -0.539*** -0.371***
Int. rate (-1) (ρ) 0.785*** 0.783*** 0.801*** 0.833***
E. inﬂ. (β∗) 0.438*** 0.522*** 0.569*** 0.321***
Out. gap (γ∗) 0.076** 0.1313*** 0.062*** 0.068***
M3 Growth -0.072***
Fed funds 0.063***
Int. rate UK 0.070***
Recession
Cons. (α∗) -0.178 1.849*** -1.894*** -1.451***
Int. rate (-1) (ρ) 0.893*** 0.798*** 0.576*** 0.103***
E. inﬂ. (β∗) 0.215*** 0.390*** 1.437*** 2.233***
Out. gap (γ∗) 0.141** 0.210*** 0.007 -0.130***
M3 Growth -0.203***
Fed funds 0.159***
Int. rate UK 0 0.242***
Adj. R2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99
Obs. 93 89 82 82
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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